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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78A-4-103(2)(j)(2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
We are not dissatisfied with Mr. Claypoole's Statement of the Issues. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a pair of automobile accidents which occurred on a 
snowy day in February 7, 2001, in Layton, Utah. Mr. Claypoole was driving down 
1200 West in Layton, Utah, when he stopped his vehicle to avoid hitting a motorist 
who was sliding in front of him. Mr. Claypoole was then rear-ended by Neil Skougard 
at a speed of between three and eight miles an hour. After Mr. Claypoole and Mr. 
Skougard pulled their vehicles to the side of the road, Michael Wood collided with 
the side of Mr. Claypoole's vehicle. Mr. Claypoole described the first impact with 
Mr. Skougard as "far harder" than the impact with Mr. Wood. 
Mr. Claypoole had also been involved in an automobile accident in January 
2000. While traveling in Nevada, Mr. Claypoole had stopped for another accident 
when he was struck by David Alston at 65 miles per hour. In October 2000, Mr. 
Claypoole had surgery to repair neck damage stemming from that accident. In 
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addition to these accidents, Mr. Claypoole had reported a ten- to 35-year history of 
low back pain to various physicians. 
In January, 2006, Mr. Claypoole underwent low back surgery in Sacramento, 
California, and severe surgical complications nearly resulted in his death and have 
left him with leg problems and continuing low back pain. 
By the time of trial, Mr. Alston had settled all claims related to the January 
2000 accident and Mr. Skougard had settled all claims relating to his collision of 
February 7, 2001. The remaining issue to be tried was whether Mr. Claypoole 
suffered any injuries from the collision with Michael Wood's vehicle on February 7, 
2001. The jury concluded that Mr. Claypoole suffered no injuries in his collision 
with Michael Wood. (R. 1417) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ken Claypoole was 5 2 years old at the time of the accidents in February, 
2001. 
2. On January 2, 2000, Ken Claypoole was involved in an accident in the 
State of Nevada. Another motorist, David Alston, lost control of his 
vehicle on slick roads and struck Mr. Claypoole's vehicle at 
approximately 65 miles per hour. (R. 1623, p. 339). 
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Mr. Claypoole suffered injuries to his neck and low back in that 
accident. (R. 1623, p. 335). 
In October 2000, Mr. Claypoole had surgery on his neck due to injuries 
suffered in the January 2000, accident. (R. 1623, p. 370). 
On February 7, 2001, Mr. Claypoole was driving southbound on 1200 
West in Layton, Utah, when another motorist in front of him started to 
lose control due to snow on the roads. (R.1623, p. 343). 
Mr. Claypoole brought his vehicle to a stop and was rear-ended by Neil 
Skougard. (R.1623, p. 346). 
Mr. Claypoole's expert witnesses estimated the speed of Mr. Skougard's 
vehicle at impact as between three and eight miles per hour. (R. 1622, 
p. 282). 
The motorists moved their vehicles to the side of the road and waited for 
law enforcement to arrive. (R. 1623, p. 348). 
Shortly thereafter, a vehicle driven by Michael Wood was sliding to a 
stop and struck Mr. Claypoole's vehicle. (R. 1623, p. 351). Whether Mr. 
Wood merely sideswiped Mr. Claypoole's vehicle or impacted the rear 
of his vehicle was a subject of considerable debate at trial. 
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Mr. Claypoole testified in his deposition and at trial that the first impact 
involving Mr. Skougard was "far harder" than the second impact with 
Mr. Wood. (R. 1623, pp. 357-58). 
The defense biomechanical engineering expert witness, Dr. Wilson 
Hayes, testified that based on all the eyidence and specifically Mr. 
Claypoole's testimony that his vehicle did not move during the impact 
with Mr. Wood, the injury potential for the second accident was next to 
zero. (R. 1623, p. 488). 
In January, 2006, Mr. Claypoole had surgery on his low back by Dr. 
Elvert Nelson. (R. 1621, p. 172-73). 
Dr. Nelson's operative report indicates that the surgery was needed 
because Mr. Claypoole had a ten year history of low back pain and had 
recently lifted a heavy object causing him pain so severe he was unable 
even to ambulate to the bathroom. (R. 1621, p. 173). 
Mr. Claypoole never mentioned to Dr. Nelson the automobile accidents 
of February 7, 2001, as a potential cause of his low back pain. (Id). 
Rather, this was information learned from Mr. Claypoole's counsel six 
months after the surgery. (R. 1621, p. 174}. 
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15. At trial, the court conducted the initial voir dire of the jury panel. (R. 
1621, pp. 3-38). Included in this examination were questions relating to 
the potential jurors' exposure and reaction to tort reform initiatives and 
the plaintiffs right to seek damages in a court of law. (R. 1621, pp. 32-
34). 
16. During a sidebar conference, Mr. Claypoole's counsel asked the court 
to inquire of the panel regarding their willingness to apply the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. (R. 1621, p. 37). The court 
did so. Id. 
17. The court then invited counsel to examine the jurors. Mr. Claypoole's 
counsel asked two questions and then reported he had no further 
questions. (R. 1621, p. 40). 
18. During the trial, Mr. Claypoole called two of his closest friends, Sam 
Turner and Fred Wasilewski. Both testified that Mr. Claypoole had 
returned to health from the injuries suffered in the January 2000, 
accident prior to the February 7, 2001, collisions. Both further 
attributed all Mr. Claypoole's present difficulties to the 2001 accidents. 
(R. 1621, pp. 58-115). 
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19. On May 8, 2002, Mr. Claypoole's counsel wrote a letter to the insurer 
for David Alston outlining the injuries suffered in the January 2000, 
Nevada accident. Although this letter was written after the February 7, 
2001, accidents, Mr. Claypoole claimed the January 2000, accident had 
reduced him to a sedentary lifestyle: 
Prior to this crash, Mr. Claypoole enjoyed playing tennis 
and golf, and spending time witjh his granddaughter, 
however, due to the debilitating nature of his injuries he 
can no longer enjoy these activities and is reduced to a 
sedentary lifestyle. 
(R. 1621, p. 114). 
20. This letter was also provided to and relied upon by Mr. Claypoole's 
retained biomechanical engineer, Dr. John Jurist. (R. 1621, p. 313-315). 
21. The jury concluded that Mr. Claypoole did not suffer any injuries from 
the impact between Mr. Wood's and Mr. Claypoole's vehicles. (R. 
1417). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Voir Dire. The trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in the 
conduct of voir dire. The trial court properly conducted voir dire in accordance with 
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and there was no requirement that the 
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court employ a jury questionnaire when requested by Mr. Claypoole. Moreover, the 
trial court adequately inquired of the jury panel regarding their exposure and response 
to tort reform campaigns. Finally, Mr. Claypoole waived any challenge to the 
conduct of voir dire by failing to make a contemporaneous objection to the conduct 
of voir dire at trial. 
II. Admission of Evidence. The trial court did not abuse its wide discretion 
by admitting statements made by Mr. Claypoole's counsel during settlement 
negotiations relating to a prior claim. Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does 
not bar admission of settlement information relating to a claim other than the one 
being litigated. Moreover, Mr. Claypoole injected the information into the trial by 
providing it to his expert witness and asking him to rely on it in the formation of his 
opinions. Mr. Claypoole has failed to show that any alleged error in the admission 
of this evidence was harmful, nor has he provided this court with the entire transcript 
of the trial and, therefore, this court has no ability to make such a determination on 
its own. 
III. Special Verdict. The special verdict form was not confusing. The 
introductory paragraph of the form, which requested that the jury resolve certain 
questions by a preponderance of the evidence, was consistent with the jury 
instructions used by the court and the voir dire questions employed by the court and 
7 
Mr. Claypoole's counsel. The jury was well instructed as to the burden of proof and 
the meaning of "preponderance of the evidence." The issue was also waived by Mr. 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN CONDUCTING VOIR DIRE 
A. MR. CLAYPOOLE WAIVED ANY OBJECTIONS TO VOIR DIRE. 
Mr. Claypoole claims the trial court erred in conducting voir dire by: (1) failing 
to use Mr. Claypoole's requested jury questionnaire; (2) failing to allow attorney 
conducted voir dire; (3) failing to ask all questions in his written requested voir dire; 
and (4) asking "broad questions in regard to tort reform." Mr. Claypoole only raised 
an objection to the first of these alleged errors and he is barred from raising the other 
issues on appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that a party may not appeal a trial 
court's actions unless a contemporaneous objection was made before the lower court: 
We have consistently held that a defendant who fails to preserve an 
objection at trial will not be able to raise that objection on appeal unless 
he is able to demonstrate either plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
8 
See State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, \ 9, 46 P.3d 230; Monson v. Carver, 
928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). This rule is designed to (1) ensure 
that the trial court has "an opportunity to address the claimed error, and 
if appropriate, correct it," and (2) inhibit a defendant from "forego [ing] 
... an objection with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances 
of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,... claiming on appeal that the 
[c]ourt should reverse." Cram, 2002 UT 37, If 10,46 P.3d 230 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Stated another way, under our preservation 
rule, '"defendants are... not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting 
at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal.'" Id. *|f 10. 
State v. King, 2006 UT 3, f 13,131 P.3d 202, 205 (ellipses in original). In King, the 
Utah Supreme C ourt was asked to consider whether a contemporaneous obj ection was 
required with respect to alleged errors in voir dire. The court held an objection was 
necessary to preserve the matter for appeal: 
In summary, because of counsel's advantaged position and the relative 
ease with which any claim of bias can be remedied during the selection 
process, we hold that, just as with the trial process itself, the jury 
selection process is subject to the procedural safeguards of the 
adversarial system of justice. We accordingly hold that objections to the 
trial court's conduct during voir dire are not exempt from the 
preservation rule. 
Id. T| 18, 131 P. 3d at 206. Indeed, in each of the Utah appellate cases involving 
inquiry into tori reform, the plaintiffs' counsel objected to the failure to ask such 
questions. See Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)("Over 
appellant's objection, the trial judge refused to ask the jurors any of appellant's 
submitted questions specifically directed at the issue of tort reform."); Bee v. 
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Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, 204 P.3d 204 ("Bee asserts that he again 
raised the issue of the tort reform questions during a sidebar held off the record at the 
close of voir dire but that the trial court rejected his request to question the potential 
jurors on the issue."); Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460,463 (Utah Ct.App. 1991)("At the 
conclusion of the two-hour voir dire, the judge impaneled the jury over plaintiff s 
objections") 
In our case, Mr. Claypoole did make a motion to Use a jury questionnaire prior 
to trial and this motion was denied. (R. 1308). However, Mr. Claypoole made no 
other objections to either the manner or conduct of voir dire. For instance, Mr. 
Claypoole claims he requested attorney-conducted voir dire and only moved the trial 
court to employ a jury questionnaire when that request was denied. We have 
searched the record and can find no reference to a request by Mr. Claypoole for 
attorney-conducted voir dire, nor an objection to the trial court's decision to initially 
conduct voir dire before permitting additional questions by counsel. (In his brief, Mr. 
Claypoole provides no citation to the record demonstrating a contemporaneous 
objection or even a request for attorney-conducted voir dire.) 
Next, Mr. Claypoole claims that after refusing to use a jury questionnaire, the 
trial court erred by refusing to ask all the questions included in Mr. Claypoole's 
10 
written request for voir dire. During trial, however, no objection was raised regarding 
the failure to ask all requested voir dire questions. 
This court's decision earlier this month in Boyle v. Christensen, -P.3d-, 2009 
UT App. 241 (September 3,2009), is dispositive on this issue. There, as here, the trial 
court refused to submit a questionnaire and did not ask all the questions requested by 
the parties prior to trial: 
As trial approached, Mr. Boyle submitted a proposed jury questionnaire 
that included specific questions intended to elicit jurors1 views regarding 
damages and tort reform. Christensen also submitted proposed voir dire 
questions, and the district court edited and combined the parties' 
proposed questions into a single set of voir dire questions that did not 
contain the exact questions posed by either party. The district court 
conducted voir dire using its own questions without objection from 
either party. At the close of voir dire, both Mr. Boyle and Christensen 
passed the jury for cause. 
Id. f 4. As here, the plaintiff claimed the mere submission of voir dire questions prior 
to trial was sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. This court held that the 
plaintiffs failure to object to the questioning waived the right of appeal: 
Mr. Boyle argues on appeal that his mere submission of specific jury 
questions relating to damages and tort reform preserves for appeal his 
claim that the voir dire questions the district court actually posed were 
inadequate. We disagree. ff[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] 
the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial 
court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main St v. Easy 
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, \ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court attempted to 
reconcile the parties' proposed jury questions into a single set of voir 
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dire questions that addressed each party's concerns. If Mr. Boyle 
believed that the district couifs modification of his questions constituted 
error on the part of the district court, it was his obligation to bring this 
alleged error to the district court's attention, His failure to do so 
constitutes a waiver of the issue as one for appeal. 
Id.\\2. 
This case presents a more compelling case that Mr. Claypoole waived his right 
to appeal alleged deficiencies in the voir dire than Boyle. Unlike Boyle, Mr. 
Claypoole's counsel was permitted to pose any additional questions to the jury panel 
he felt relevant. Mr. Claypoole's counsel posed two questions to the panel before 
announcing that he had no further inquiries: 
Mr. Havas, other questions you wish to ask? 
MR. HAVAS: Yes, Your Honor, just following up on that, on the 
preponderance, some people think preponderance essentially is we, the 
plaintiff, Mr. Claypoole, has just a little bit of a burden to show that the 
burden that we're going to show you, that we're a little bit more right 
than wrong. Some people disagree with that, think that's unfair to the 
defense that we only have to show a little bit more right than wrong. Is 
there anyone of you that is in a camp where the people feel that that is 
not fair? Or on the other hand, is there anyone that feels that that is fair 
burden for us to only have to prove a little bit more right than wrong? 
Thank you. 
Another question that I would like to have answered is to make 
sure that the harms or the losses that we're going to be asking you about, 
can only be compensated by award of money. That's the way our system 
is and that the money must solely be decided on the basis of the harms 
and losses that we're claiming that the defense caused. Is there anyone 
here that feels that that is unfair or is there anyone here that is all right 
that? Is there anyone here that feels that that is okay to — 
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THE COURT: Let's ask it another way. Ladies and gentlemen, are 
there any of you that feel that it would be unfair to award a money 
judgment as far as payment for damage in a case such as this? Thank 
you. Anything further Mr. Havas? 
MR. HAVAS: Yes Your Honor. They neglected to indicate to you 
that one of the defendant is a company called Winward Electric Supply 
Company Incorporated and I'd like to know if anyone is familiar with 
Winward Electric Supply Company Incorporated. 
THE COURT: Ms. Sorensen? 
MS. SORENSEN: I'm just familiar in that I do bookkeeping for 
a contractor that has used them and just pay bills. I don't know them 
personally. 
MR. HAVAS: All right, and is this contractor that you're doing 
work for, you still do work for them today? 
MS. SORENSEN: Yes. 
MR. HAVAS: Does this contractor still use Windward Electric 
Supply Company that you know of? 
MS. SORENSEN: I usually don't know until I do the bills but he 
has used them in the last six months. 
MR. HAVAS: You have not had any relationship — 
MS. SORENSEN: I don't have any personal contact with them. 
MR. HAVAS: Is there anyone else that has had any contact with 
Winward Electric Supply Co? / think that's all the questions I have. 
(R. 1621, pp. 38-40). In his brief, Mr. Claypoole fails to identify what questions be 
believes should have been posed to the panel prior to exercise of peremptory 
challenges. Perhaps more importantly, he fails to explain why his own counsel failed 
to ask these questions when provided the opportunity to do so. 
A similar circumstance existed in Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d391 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). There, the trial court inquired during voir dire regarding tort reform. 
After the jury was impaneled, but before evidence began, one juror, Bascomb, 
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revealed he recalled reading an article on tort reform in Reader's Digest. After 
examination of Juror Bascomb, which included questioning from plaintiff s counsel, 
the trial court denied plaintiffs motion for a mistrial. On appeal, plaintiff argued she 
was denied the opportunity to fully examine Bascomb as to his potential biases. In 
rejecting this argument, this Court stated: 
Finally, Rasmussen's complaint that the trial court did not allow her to 
"formulate and ask questions that could reveal bias on Mr. Branscomb's 
part" is without merit. The transcript shows the court invited counsel 
from both sides to question Branscomb. The court said nothing to limit 
the form or substance of counsels' questions. A,fter the two questions 
Rasmussen's counsel chose to ask, he did not say he wished to pose 
further questions. Thus, he did not present the trial court an opportunity 
to rule on this issue and we will not address it further on appeal. See 
Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App.1989). 
Id. at 395. 
In our case, there is no suggestion that counsel was barred from asking 
additional questions, nor that he was precluded from asking questions relating to tort 
reform or any other subject of interest. Mr. Claypoole's counsel simply asked no 
further questions and it must be assumed he had gathered all the information he 
deemed essential to an effective exercise of his peremptory challenges. 
Mr. Claypoole contends that the trial court asked "broad questions in regard to 
tort reform" and complains the manner in which the questions were posed denied him 
an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. No where in the record does Mr. 
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Claypoole object to the manner in which any question was posed nor did Mr. 
Claypoole ask more incisive questions when given the opportunity to do so. 
Mr. Claypoole has waived any objection to the conduct of voir dire. Mr. 
Claypoole did not object to the trial court's failure to ask additional questions relating 
to tort reform, nor did Mr. Claypoole's counsel avail himself of the opportunity of 
asking such questions when given the opportunity to do so. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONDUCTING VOIR DIRE 
QUESTIONING. 
Even assuming the issue has been preserved for appeal, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in the conduct of voir dire. This court has held that'" [t]he manner 
and method of voir dire lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.' State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 797 (Utah 1991). Thus, we review only for an abuse of 
discretion." Statev. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201,204-05 (UtahCt. App. 1992). The Utah 
Supreme Court has also held that "[traditionally, the trial court is given considerable 
latitude as to the manner and form of conducting the voir dire examination and is only 
restricted in that discretion from committing prejudicial error." State v. Malmrose, 
649 P.2d 56,60 (Utah \9%2){overruledon other grounds State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986)). 
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Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to use a jury 
questionnaire. Rather than using a jury questionnaire, the trial court conducted voir 
dire in accordance with Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides: 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself 
conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the 
parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further 
inquiry as is material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective 
jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is 
material and proper. Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make 
a preliminary statement of the case. The court may permit the parties or 
their attorneys to make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify 
the parties in advance of trial. 
UTAH R.CIV.P. 47(a)(emphasis added). The trial cclurt conducted much of the 
examination but also permitted Mr. Claypoole's counsel to ask the jury panel any 
questions he deemed necessary for an effective exercise of his peremptory challenges. 
There is no support for Mr. Claypoole's contention that the trial court was 
required to use a jury questionnaire. The Utah Supreme Court recently considered 
the use of jury questionnaires in State v. Mead, 27 P. 3d 1115 (Utah 2001). There, the 
defendant sought to use a jury questionnaire to explore potential jurors' exposure to 
pre-trial publicity: 
Mead first argues the trial court abused its discretion by not using a jury 
questionnaire and/or individual, in camera voir dire to determine jurors' 
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potential biases and prejudices stemming from exposure to prior media 
coverage of the criminal case and related civil suit in federal court. We 
disagree. 
Id. at 1123. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to use a jury questionnaire: 
While it may be advisable for a trial court to use a jury questionnaire in 
certain situations, the trial court has "considerable latitude as to the 
manner and form of conducting the voir dire examination." State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56,60 (Utah 1982). We cannot say the court abused 
its discretion in the instant case. Indeed, as the questions asked in voir 
dire were substantially similar to those requested in the proposed jury 
questionnaire, even were we to assume the trial court erred in failing to 
use the proposed jury questionnaire, Mead has demonstrated no harm. 
Id. at 1124. 
The holding in Mead is consistent with the case law in other jurisdictions. See, 
e.g., People v. Tafoya, 164 P.3d 590 (Cal. 2007)("Whether the prospective jurors are 
required to complete a written questionnaire is a matter within the trial court's 
discretion."); Hooker v. State, 716 So.2d 1104,1115 (Miss. 1998)("Our case law does 
not indicate that a defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to submit a jury 
questionnaire."); United States v. Tomero, 486 F.Supp.2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007)("Whether to use a jury questionnaire is within the discretion of the Court.") 
We have found no case law from any jurisdiction holding that a trial court must 
use a jury questionnaire when requested by a party, even in a death penalty case. 
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Indeed, such a ruling would effectively abrogate Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which allows the trial court to directly question the panel, allow the 
attorneys to do so, or, as here, employ some combination of both methods. 
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the 
attorneys to conduct the voir dire. This issue was dealt with conclusively in Barrett 
v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). there, this court specifically 
addressed and rejected a similar argument: 
Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by 
refusing to allow counsel either to personally conduct voir dire or to 
supplement voir dire with his proposed questions. Appellant relies on 
Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 752 P.2d 210 (1988), in which the 
Nevada Supreme Court held that "[a] complete denial of 
attorney-conducted voir dire cannot be construed as a reasonable 
restriction and therefore the trial judge committed reversible error." Id. 
752 P.2d at 213. While this may be the law in Nevada, Utah courts, 
according to long-standing custom, usually conduct voir dire 
themselves. See Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d445,447 (Utah 
App. 1989) (trial judge has considerable discretion in directing manner 
and form of voir dire examination). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47(a) 
specifically invests trial judges with the discretion to either allow or 
disallow direct voir dire questioning by counsel. Rule 47(a) provides: 
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to 
conduct the examination of prospective jurdrs or may itself 
conduct the examination. In the latter event^  the court shall 
permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as i^  material and 
proper or shall itself 'submit to the prospective jurors such 
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is 
material and proper. 
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Utah R.Civ.P. 47(a) (emphasis added). The rule directs that if the trial 
court itself conducts voir dire, it must allow additional inquiry, either by 
the court or by the parties, "as is material and proper." Id. This language 
gives the trial court discretion in determining whether questions 
submitted by counsel are material to the case at hand, and whether such 
questions are proper for jury voir dire. While the trial court is obliged to 
conduct voir dire so as to allow counsel to intelligently exercise 
peremptory challenges, Rule 47(a) does not require that all of counsel's 
submitted questions be asked, nor that they be asked in the exact form 
as submitted by counsel, much less does it require that counsel pose the 
questions. In the end, it is which questions are asked that matters-not 
who asks them. 
Id. at 101 n.6. As Barrett demonstrates, the trial court could reasonably have refused 
to allow counsel for Mr. Claypoole to ask any questions. The fact the trial court 
permitted counsel to pose questions directly to the panel was an appropriate exercise 
of the court's discretion. Mr. Claypoole has provided no argument for Barrett to be 
overturned and, therefore, the jury's verdict should be sustained. 
The Barrett decision also resolves Mr. Claypoole's claim that the trial court 
should have asked all of his requested voir dire. Mr. Claypoole submitted 46 separate 
questions he wanted to be posed to the jury. (R. 1383). As this court held in Barrett, 
"Rule 47(a) does not require that all of counsel's submitted questions be asked." Id. 
It was quite apparent that Mr. Claypoole did not view these 46 questions as critical 
to his exercise of peremptory challenges. After all, when given the opportunity to 
question the jury panel directly, Mr. Claypoole's counsel asked only two of the 46 
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submitted questions and did not object to the court's failure to pose the remaining 
inquiries. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONDUCTED VOIR DIRE WITH 
RESPECT TO TORT REFORM. 
In Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96,97 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court 
of Appeals held that a trial court must ask, when requested by plaintiff, whether any 
juror had been exposed to tort reform advertising or information: 
Thus, concluded the Evans court, the trial court should have asked the 
potential jurors some of the plaintiffs questions concerning their 
exposure to tort reform material, not just questions concerning whether 
they, in their personal opinion, had been biased by any such exposure. 
Id. 
In light of the pervasive dissemination of tort-reform information, 
and the corresponding potential for general exposure to such 
information by potential jurors, a plaintiff is entitled to know which 
potential jurors, if any, have been so exposed. See id. Plaintiff is entitled 
to such information absent any particular showing of specific 
campaigns, advertisements, or literature offered for the purpose of 
showing potential prejudice. See id. Failure to ask such questions 
ignores the plaintiffs "need to gather information to assist in exercising 
... peremptory challenges." Id. 
Id. at 101. In this case, the trial court specifically a$ked questions regarding a 
plaintiffs right to seek damages for a wrong and exposure to tort reform literature: 
THE COURT: Let me just ask the next question that comes along then. 
First of all you need to understand that in our system of law that when 
we feel we've been damaged by another or that we have a dispute that 
we can't resolve, we have a right to come to court and have a jury of our 
peers resolve those things and recover damages that may have been 
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caused as a result of that situation. Are there any of you who disagree 
with that right that we have? Response is negative. Are there any of you 
who could not award to Mr. Claypoole the full extent of any damage that 
was supported by the evidence? Response is negative. 
(R. 1621, p. 34). The trial court further asked: 
THE COURT: Oh, that we excused. Oh, that's right, here it is in my 
notes. All right. We've taken care of that. The next questions I have to 
ask you have to do with the philosophy behind kind of what we're doing 
here today and so I'd like to ask you whether or not any of you have 
reads any articles or seen any programs or documentaries on TV about 
lawsuits and crises that may have arisen as a result of excessive jury 
verdicts. Do any of you recall anything about that that you've seen or 
heard or that you remember? Ms. Adams, anything you can recall 
specifically? 
MS. ADAMS: Just basic programs on TV like CSI and stuff, that's all. 
(R. 1621, p. 32) Finally, the court asked about whether any jurors felt there was a 
lawsuit crisis in the United States: 
THE COURT: The criminal kinds of things. All right. The next thing I'd 
like to ask you, do any of you hold the opinion that in this country today 
there's a lawsuit crisis caused by excessive jury verdicts? Do any of you 
hold that kind of an attitude? Ms. Sorensen? 
MS. SORENSEN: I do. 
THE COURT: You can tell us a little bit about that. 
MS. SORENSEN: I think, do you want me to tell you?I think there's too 
much — 
THE COURT: Well, let me phrase it in this sense, I'm certain we're all 
concerned about things that we have that we observe in our society. The 
question becomes as you sit here as a juror in regards to the plaintiff 
here, Mr. Claypoole and these other individuals as defendant, what we 
are looking for is a juror that would be able to look at the facts as they're 
presented during the course of the trial and render a fair judgment 
without prejudgement or predilection to go in a certain direction or do 
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a certain thing. For instance, are you feelings such that you could not 
award to Mr. Claypoole a judgment of damages if you felt it was 
supported by the evidence? Would you be able to do that? 
MS. SORENSEN: I would be able to. 
(R. 1621, pp. 32-33). These questions were adequate to explore any exposure to tort 
reform advertisements and the effect such exposure may have had on the potential 
jurors. As set forth above, Mr. Claypoole's counsel did not object to the nature of 
this examination or request additional questions be posed on the issue. Moreover, Mr. 
Claypoole's counsel did not pose any questions regarding tort reform when given the 
opportunity to directly examine the potential jurors. Thus, we must presume the trial 
court's questioning complied with the holding of Barrett. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR W PERMITTING 
REFERENCE TO SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN 
AN ANOTHER CLAIM 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Claypoole was involved in an 
automobile accident on January 4, 2000, in Nevada, fie later brought an action 
against David Alston, the driver of other vehicle involved in that collision. On May 
8, 2002, Mr. Claypoole's counsel sent a letter to Mr. Alston's insurer regarding the 
January 2000, accident. In that letter, Mr. Havas represented: 
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Prior to this crash, Mr. Claypoole enjoyed playing tennis and golf, and 
spending time with his granddaughter, however, due to the debilitating 
nature of his injuries he can no longer enjoy these activities and is 
reduced to a sedentary lifestyle. 
(R. 1621, p. 114). As part of preparations for trial in our case, Mr. Claypoole's 
counsel provided this letter to Dr. John Jurist, his biomechanical engineering expert 
witness, for consideration and review in the formulation of his opinions. 
At trial, Mr. Claypoole denied that his sedentary lifestyle was the direct result 
of injuries suffered in the January 2000 accident. Rather, he claimed all his 
disabilities stemmed from injuries suffered in the February 7, 2001, collisions. Mr. 
Claypoole called two of his closest friends, Sam Turner and Fred Wasilewski, to 
testify that he had made a full recovery after the January 2000 accident and suffered 
a significant decline in physical functioning after February 7, 2001. The trial court 
concluded that the letter from Mr. Havas to Mr. Alston's insurer could be used to 
impeach the testimony of Mr. Claypoole's friends that all his injuries stemmed from 
the February 7, 2001, accidents: 
THE COURT: First of all, I would reserve ruling on the issue but I will 
allow counsel to cross examine the witnesses relative to the fact that in 
settlement of the prior accident which the jury has already heard about, 
that it was represented that certain things sought as a result of that 
accident. So you can cross examine the witnesses as far as that 
indication is made in the letter. 
(R. 1621, p. 80-81). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
"The admissibility of an item of evidence is a letal question." Jensen v. 
Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,11f 12, 977 P.2d 474. 
However, the trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining 
whether to admit or exclude evidence, and (its ruling will not be 
overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion. See id. at fflj 12, 14; 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); Sfate v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 
681, 684 (Utah 1985). 
Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Utah ^000). Stated differently, this 
court will not reverse the verdict unless the trial court ]s decision to admit evidence 
"was beyond the limits of reasonability." Jensen v. IHC Hospital, 82 P.3d 1076,1089 
(Utah 2003). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by pertmitting the defense to cross-
examine factual witnesses using the May 8,2002, letter. Although no Utah appellate 
authority exists, case law from other jurisdictions universally holds that Rule 408 
does not bar the admission of settlement-related information in cases unrelated to the 
claim being tried. For instance, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 
Rule 408 only bars admission of evidence relating to settlement 
discussions if that evidence is offered to prove "liability for or invalidity 
of the claim or its amount." Here, the evidence Mated to an entirely 
different claim-the evidence was not admitted to prove the validity or 
amount of the "claim under negotiation." Vulcan Hart Corp. v. NLRB, 
718 F.2d 269,277 (8th Cir. 1983); see also 2 Jack Weinstein & Margaret 
Berger, Weinstein'sEvidence^408, at408-32to 3} (1991)("Wherethe 
settlement negotiations and terms explain and are a part of another 
dispute they must often be admitted if the trier is to understand the 
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case."). Thus, Rule 408 did not bar this evidence because it related to 
settlement discussions that involved a different claim than the one at 
issue in the current trial. 
Broadcort Capital Corp. v. Summa Medical Corp., 972 F.2d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 
1992). One federal district court has summarized the case law as follows: 
Rule 408 forbids admission of evidence from compromises or 
compromise negotiations "to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim 
or its amount." Fed.R.Evid. 408 (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit 
has noted that "[r]ead literally, the rule does not appear to cover 
compromises and compromise offers that do not involve the dispute that 
is the subject of the suit, even if one of the parties to the suit was also a 
party to the compromise." Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 
1356, 1363 (10th Cir.1987). Substantial authority supports Alberto's 
contention that Rule 408 only bars evidence of settlement negotiations 
to prove the validity or amount of the claim under negotiation. "Rule 
408 does not require the exclusion of evidence regarding the settlement 
of a claim different from the one litigated." Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., 
Inc., I l l F.3d 758, 770 (10th Cir.1997); see also Broadcort Capital 
Corp. v. Summa Med. Corp., 972 F.2d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir.1992). The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that the "general principle" 
is that "Rule 408 only bars the use of compromise evidence to prove the 
validity or invalidity of the claim that was the subject of the 
compromise, not some other claim." Uforma/Shelby Business Forms, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1284,1293-94(6thCir.l997) (quoting23 Wright 
& Grahcim, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 5314 n.25). 
Notwithstanding Rule 408, settlement evidence regarding a claim or 
dispute different from the one being litigated has been held admissible 
in numerous other cases. See Wyatt v. Security Inn Food & Beverage, 
819 F.2d 69, 71 (4th Cir.1987); Vulcan Hart Corp. v. National Labor 
Relations Bd., 718 F.2d 269, 277 (8th Cir. 1983); Herman v. City of 
Allentown, 985 F.Supp. 569, 577 (E.D.Pa.1997); United States v. 
McCorkle, 1994 WL 329679, at *2 (N.D.I11. July 7,1994) ("[ ]Rule 408 
does not bar settlement information in one case from admissibility in 
another case."). 
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Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Company, Inc., 2004, WL 1899927, *29 (N.D.I11., 
August 23, 2004). See, also, Dahlgren v. First Nat. fiank of Holdredge, 553 P.3d 
681, 699-700 (8th Cir. 2008). The trial court's ruling was consistent with this 
authority and did not constitute an "abuse of discretion." 
Although Mr. Claypoole complains that the defense should not have been 
allowed to impeach Mr. Turner and Mr. Wasilewski using this information, he 
ignores the fact that the jury was going to hear the contents of the letter during the 
testimony of Dr. John Jurist, his biomechanical engineering expert witness. As set 
forth above, Mr. Claypoole provided the letter to Dr. Jurist for review in preparation 
of his expert conclusions and the trial court ruled that "[c|]ertainly it will come in with 
Dr. Jurist but certainly any information relative to insurance has to be redacted." (R. 
1621, p. 81). 
Mr. Claypoole does not claim in his brief that the trial court erred in permitting 
the examination of Dr. Jurist with respect to this letter and, specifically, the paragraph 
attributing Mr. Claypoole's physical disabilities to his January 2000 accident. This 
is understandable because the law is abundantly clear that a party may examine an 
expert witness on any materials provided for his review and consideration. The 
Georgia Court of Appeals' decision in Lewis v. Emory Univ., 509 S.E.2d 635 
(Ga.Ct.App. 1999), is instructive. There, counsel for Emory University sent to 
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counsel for Mr. Lewis an information summary of the case. The memorandum 
included the notation: 
"As we also discussed, this will confirm that this summary is being 
provided only for informational purposes, and should litigation ensue, 
it will not be used by either party for any purpose, whether as direct 
evidence, impeachment, for cross-examination, etc." 
Id. at 819. Emory University later provided the summary to its own expert who read 
the document. In holding that plaintiffs counsel could properly cross-examine the 
expert regarding the summary, the Georgia Court of Appeals held: 
"The right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination shall belong to 
every party as to the witnesses called against him." And as the Supreme 
Court has written: "a party who relies upon a witness1 opinion may not 
withhold from the jury the facts that are relied upon in forming the 
opinion, [cits.]. Furthermore, a jury is entitled to know all of the facts 
upon which the witness' opinion rests and the facts may be brought out 
on cross-examination. [Cits.]" 
By giving the letter to its expert, Emory violated the agreement 
between the parties not to use it in the litigation. No valid ground is 
presented to show that it did not waive the agreement by so doing. 
Reliance on the report by Emory's expert requires allowing Lewis to 
cross-examine Ornato using the letter. The deposition reveals that 
Emory's argument that Lewis attempted to use the letter in a prejudicial 
manner is without merit. 
Id. at 643-44. In Ratliffv. Schiber Truck Co., Inc., 150 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 1998), the 
decedent was killed in a collision with defendant's truck. At trial, the defendant 
cross-examined plaintiffs expert regarding the conclusions of the investigating 
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patrolman. In concluding the trial court did not err in permitting this examination, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
Appellants also assert as an additional basis fjpr a new trial, that the 
district court erred in allowing counsel to cross-examine Mr. Oldham as 
to Sergeant Gray's report. Appellants argue that because Sergeant Gray 
did not testify at trial, discussion of the report he created was 
impermissible hearsay. 
Generally, a trial court has broad discretion in the matter of 
regulating cross examination, and the exercise i)f such discretion will 
not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Palmer v. Krueger, 
897 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1990). Once experj testimony has been 
admitted, the rules of evidence then place "the full burden of exploration 
of facts and assumptions underlying the testimony of an expert witness 
squarely on the shoulders of opposing counsel's cross-examination." 
Newell Puerto Rico, Ltd. v. Rubbermaid Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 20 (1st 
Cir.1994). It is thus the burden of opposing counsel to explore and 
expose any weaknesses in the underpinnings of the expert's opinion. Id. 
at 21 (citation omitted). 
* * * 
We believe that the district court did not err by permitting counsel to 
cross-examine Mr. Oldham concerning the report bf Sergeant Gray. Mr. 
Oldham admitted that he had read the report prior to submitting his own 
report. Therefore counsel was free to cross-examibe the expert as to all 
documents he reviewed in establishing his opinion. 
Id. at 955. Similarly, in Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Cprp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 
1995), the family of a man who died from burns received when his boat exploded 
sued the boat's manufacturer. At trial, the defendant exanjiined plaintiffs expert with 
the deposition of other non-testifying experts. In concluding this was appropriate, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held: 
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We believe that the district court acted within its discretion in permitting 
such cross-examination of Halsey. Once Halsey testified that he had 
read and rejected the other experts' out-of-court opinions on the source 
of the fire, defendants were free to explore the basis for that 
disagreement and to attempt to discredit Halsey's conclusion. 
Id. at 157. See, also, Wipfv. Kowalski, 519 F.3d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 2008)("As a 
general rule, there is certainly nothing problematic about asking an expert about 
materials he has read that relate to an issue at trial."); In Re Michael A 713 N.E.2d 
724 (Ill.Ct.App. 1999)("Documents relied upon by a witness in preparing his or her 
testimony are appropriate materials for cross-examination.") 
In our case, Mr. Claypoole injected the settlement letter into the case by 
providing it to Dr. Jurist and asking him to consider and rely upon it in formulating 
his opinions. Having done so, Mr. Claypoole cannot complain when the defense used 
the letter to cross-examine Dr. Jurist on the grounds for his opinions. 
The paragraph from Mr. Havas' letter was properly admitted by the trial court. 
With respect to the impeachment of Mr. Turner and Mr. Wasilewski, it was properly 
admitted because the letter was not related to the present case and, therefore, Rule 
408 does not apply. The letter was also properly admitted to impeach Dr. Jurist 
because he relied upon it in reaching his opinions. In neither case did the trial court 
abuse its considerable discretion in admitting the evidence. 
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The trial court's admission of this evidence should also be affirmed because 
Mr. Claypoole has not demonstrated that any alleged error was harmful. This court 
has held that "on appeal, the appellant has the burden of demonstrating an error was 
prejudicial-that there is a reasonable likelihood that the lerror affected the outcome of 
the proceedings." Covey v. Covey, 80 P.3d 553,559 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). In making 
this determination, this court has held that it must exarnine the complete record: 
We note that "[t]he determination of whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome is based upon a review of the 
record." Id. at 1274. "This review requires the appellate court to 
determine from the record what evidence would'have been before the 
jury absent the trial court's error." Id. ''When evidence is erroneously 
admitted, it is possible for a reviewing court to excise the offending 
evidence and evaluate the remaining uncontested evidence so as to 
determine whether the properly admitted evidence is such that the 
prevailing party would have prevailed anyway." Berrett v. Denver &Rio 
Grande W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 297 n. 10 (UtU Ct.App.1992). 
Glacier Land Co. v. Claudia Klawe & Assoc, Inc., 154 Ph3d 852, 866 (Utah Ct. App. 
2006). 
Here, Mr. Claypoole has not attempted in his brief to demonstrate that any 
harm from this alleged error. His entire argument relating to Mr. Havas' letter 
consists of two and one-half pages and includes no discussion of how the jury would 
have reached a different result had the letter been excluded from evidence. This court 
has held that a "reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
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pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party 
may dump the burden of argument and research." In Re Pahl, 2007 UT App 389, |^ 
17,174 P.3d 642, 647. Mr. Claypoole, by not including any argument showing that 
the alleged error was harmful, cannot meet the burden of proof and the trial court's 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Moreover, even if Mr. Claypoole wanted to show harmful error, he has not 
provided the complete record to this court and, therefore, could not bear his burden 
of showing that the alleged errors were harmful. As set forth in the Statement of 
Facts, the jury concluded that Mr. Claypoole did not suffer any injuries in the 
collision between Mr. Wood's vehicle and Mr. Claypoole's vehicle. The question is 
whether the exclusion of the evidence challenged by Mr. Claypoole would have 
altered that result. 
In making this determination, this court has held that a review must be made 
of all evidence presented at trial. For instance, this court has held that "even where 
error is found, reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of all the 
evidence presented at trial, it appears that 'absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that a different result would have been reached.'" Mule Hide Products v. 
White, 40 P.3d 1155, (Utah Ct. App. 2002)(emphasis added). See, also, Erickson v. 
Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802P.2d 1323,1325 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)("A substantial right 
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of a party is affected if, viewing the evidence as a whole, there is a reasonable 
likelihood a different result would have been reached absent the error.")(emphasis 
added); Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 P.^d 508, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)("[E]ven where error is found, reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, 
after review of all of the evidence presented at trial, it appears that 'absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been 
reached.'")(emphasis added). 
Mr. Claypoole has not provided this court with "all of the evidence presented 
at trial." Rather, he has supplied the trial testimony of only one (Mr. Claypoole) of 
the four witnesses to the accident. The testimony of the other witnesses, Michael 
Wood, Neil Skougard and John Fitzgerald, has not been provided. Mr. Claypoole has 
not provided the trial testimony of Dr. James Rees, the| physician who treated him 
both before and after this accident, and Dr. Bryson Smith, another physician who was 
treating Mr. Claypoole for injuries suffered in the January 2000, accident and saw 
him after the accidents of February 7, 2001. Mr. Claypoole has not provided the 
testimony from Dr. Michael Flaningham, who first treated Mr. Claypoole in June 
2003, when he moved to Sacramento, California. Nor has yt. Claypoole provided the 
testimony of Dr. Joel Dall, the defense expert witness. 
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The only evidence Mr. Claypoole has provided relating to his medical 
condition is his own trial testimony and the testimony of Dr. Elvert Nelson, the 
surgeon who first treated Mr. Claypoole three and one-half years after the accident. 
The great weight of the testimony relating to the severity of the accident and Mr. 
Claypoole's treatment before and after the accident have not been provided by Mr. 
Claypoole. 
Mr. Claypoole knew of his obligation to provide the entire trial transcript to 
this court. After Mr. Claypoole designated only a portion of the transcript, Winward 
Electric moved the trial court pursuant to Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure to designate the remainder of the evidence at trial. (R. 1505). In 
response to this motion, Mr. Claypoole acknowledged that "[i]f the plaintiff has failed 
to designate a relevant part of the record to be transcribed then the plaintiff assumes 
the risk of that omission." (R. 1531-32). 
In denying Winward Electric's motion, the trial court reminded Mr. Claypoole 
of the need to designate the entire trial testimony on appeal: 
Under the law, it is appellant's burden to show on appeal that the court 
has committed error and that the error was prejudicial to the appellant. 
To show prejudice, the appellant must show from the entire record that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the ercor affected the outcome of the 
proceeding. If the appellant cannot show that from the entire record then 
the appeal fails. The appellant suffers the consequence if the record is 
incomplete. 
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(R. 1614). Despite the clear authority from the court and the trial court's admonition 
that the entire record would be necessary, Mr. Claypoole has failed to include most 
of the trial testimony. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether the omission 
of the evidence claimed to have been erroneously admitted would have changed the 
outcome at trial. Mr. Claypoole tacitly admits this b|y failing to even argue the 
admission was harmful. 
Based upon Mr. Claypoole's failure to make any argument that the admission 
of the May 8,2002, letter was harmful and his failure to supply the complete record 
to this court, the trial court's verdict should be affirmed. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WITH RESPECT 
TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT 
Mr. Claypoole contends the special verdict completed by the jury was 
confusing because it used the terms "preponderance; of the evidence" in the 
introductory paragraph of the form. The special verdict provided as follows: 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. 
If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." 
If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a 
preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
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(R. 1417). Mr. Claypoole contends that the phrase "more likely than not" was more 
clear and should have been used. During the jury instruction conference, the law 
clerk for Mr. Claypoole's counsel expressed the following "question": 
MR. WILDING: My only other question was, on the initial paragraph 
on the jury verdict form it's talking about if something preponderates or 
not and there's also language in one of the jury instructions before 
where it talks about more likely than not and I know if I gave it to my 
wife, she'd give it back to me. She wouldn't know what it meant. 
(R. 1621, p. 517). 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the necessity of a proper and timely 
objection as follows: 
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] the issue must be presented 
to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to 
rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 
UT 48, If 14, 48 P.3d 968 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). This requirement puts the trial judge on 
notice of the asserted error and allows for correction at that time in the 
course of the proceeding. Badger, 966 P.2d at 847. For a trial court to 
be afforded an opportunity to correct the error "(1) the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] 
and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority." Brookside, 2002 UT 48 at \ 14,48 P.3d 968 
(quoting Badger, 966 P.2d at 847). 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f 51, 99 P.3d 801. 
Here, we have a number of concerns with the preservation of this issue for 
appeal. First, we note that at the time of this trial, Mr. Wilding was not licensed to 
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practice law in Utah, but rather was serving as Mr. H^vas' law clerk. We question 
whether an objection made by a law clerk, without being ratified or affirmed by 
counsel for the party, is sufficient to preserve the objection for appeal. Our research 
has located no case law in Utah or any other jurisdiction resolving the issue. We do 
believe, however, that the failure of Mr. Claypoole's counsel to share the concerns 
raised by Mr. Wilding likely persuaded the trial court to conclude there was no formal 
"objection" requiring either a ruling or a more detailed consideration of the issue. 
Second, we note that Mr. Wilding's comments are not couched as an objection. 
Rather, he raised a "question" without offering a legal analysis of the issue or an 
alternative which could be used to alleviate the alleged problem with the language 
used in the special verdict. Indeed, while in his brief Mir. Claypoole focuses on the 
need for "plain language" and contends that the special verdict was "confusing," 
neither of these points were specifically raised in Mr. Wilding's comments on the 
special verdict. In expressing the concern that his wife >vould "give it back to me," 
Mr. Wilding does not indicate whether he believes the Special verdict is confusing 
standing alone, in conjunction with the instructions, or ttiat the instructions conflict 
with the special verdict. While Mr. Wilding may "question" the special verdict, Mr. 
Claypoole never presented an alternative or requested that the trial court rule on a 
specific issue. 
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Turning to the merits of the special verdict, this Court has held that '"[i]n the 
absence of the appearance of something persuasive to the contrary, we assume that 
the jurors were conscientious in performing to their duty, and that they followed the 
instructions of the court.' State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 
(1974)." State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Here, as set forth 
below, the trial court twice instructed the jury that the phrase "preponderance of the 
evidence" meant "enough evidence to convince you that is more likely than not that 
the facts are as he claims." (R. 1621, p. 51, R. 1623, p. 525). Thus, we must presume 
that if the jury was confused as to the phrase "preponderance of the evidence" in the 
introductory paragraph of the special verdict, it would have referred back to the 
instructions and discovered its legal meaning. 
Indeed, the failure to use preponderance of the evidence in the special verdict 
would have resulted in even more confusion for the jury since the burden was 
explained in those terms from the outset of trial. At the close of voir dire, Mr. 
Claypoole's counsel asked the trial court to explain to the jury the meaning of the 
phrase "preponderance of the evidence:" 
THE COURT: Counsel have asked that I just take a moment with you, 
ladies and gentlemen, and I'll explain this in more detail as we go 
through the trial for those who are selected but you need to understand 
that as Ms. Thompson has indicated, there are really two types of cases 
that we handle. One is a criminal case and one is a civil case. This is a 
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civil case. In criminal cases the burden of propf, that means that any 
proof, any evidence in the case has to be provetd beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In civil cases the standard is the preponderance of the evidence, 
that is what weighs the most. In this kind of ca^ se we're talking about 
preponderance of the evidence and we'll talk alj>out that later on as we 
instruct in the law that applies to the case. You ljieed to understand that 
this is the kind of case that the burden of proof is that of a 
preponderance of the evidence; that is, what evidence is most believable, 
more believable, not beyond a reasonable doubt. jSo with that, do you all 
of you understand that to be the standard in this particular case? Would 
any of you have any difficulty applying that standard to this case? 
(R. 1621,pp. 37-38). Apparently wishing further satisfaction that the jury was aware 
of the meaning of preponderance of the evidence, Mr. Claypoole's counsel 
immediately asked: 
Mr. Havas, other questions you wish to ask? 
MR. HAVAS: Yes, Your Honor, just following up on that, on the 
preponderance, some people think preponderance essentially is we, the 
plaintiff, Mr. Claypoole, has just a little bit of a burden to show that the 
burden that we're going to show you, that we're a little bit more right 
than wrong. Some people disagree with that, thuik that's unfair to the 
defense that we only have to show a little bit mor^ right than wrong. Is 
there anyone of you that is in a camp where the people feel that that is 
not fair? Or on the other hand, is there anyone that feels that that is fair 
burden for us to only have to prove a little bit moire right than wrong? 
(R. 1621, p. 38). After the jury was impaneled, the trial court provided introductory 
instructions, without objection from Mr. Claypoole, regailding "preponderance of the 
evidence": 
In a civil case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving his claims by a 
preponderance of the evidence. That means that he must present enough 
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evidence to convince you that is more likely than not that the facts are 
as he claims. I will instruct you about the burden of proof again at the 
conclusion of the case. 
(R. 1621, p. 51). True to its word, the trial court instructed the jury as follow at the 
close of evidence, again without objection from Mr. Claypoole: 
When I tell you that a party has the burden of proof or that a party must 
prove something or a preponderance of the evidence I mean that the 
party must persuade you by the evidence presented in court that the fact 
is more likely to be true than not true. You may have heard that in a 
criminal case proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt but I emphasize 
to you that this is not a criminal case. In a civil case such as this one, a 
different level of proof applies, proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Another way of saying this is proof by greater weight of 
evidence, however slight. Weighing the evidence does not mean 
counting the number of witnesses nor the amount of testimony. Rather, 
it means evaluating the persuasive character of the evidence. In 
weighing the evidence you should consider all of the evidence that 
applies to a fact no matter which party has presented it. The weight to be 
given to each piece of evidence is for you to decide. 
After weighing all the evidence, if you decide that a fact is more 
likely true than not, then you must find that that fact has been proved. 
On the other hand, if you decide that the evidence regarding a fact is 
evenly balanced then you must find that the fact has not been proved and 
the party has therefore failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that 
fact. 
(R. 1623, p. 525). Based upon this record, it would have been far more confusing to 
substitute "more likely than not" for "preponderance of the evidence" when Mr. 
Havas' remarks and all the trial court's instructions were couched in the latter terms. 
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(R. 1623, p. 525). Based upon this record, it would haye been far more confusing to 
substitute "more likely than not" for "preponderance of the evidence" when Mr. 
Havas5 remarks and all the trial court's instructions wefe couched in the latter terms. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Michael Wood and Winward Electric respectfully 
request that the trial court's judgment be affirmed. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, no 
addendum is necessary as all rulings and controlling statutory citations are set forth 
verbatim in the brief. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2009. 
MORGAN, MINMOCK, RICE & JAMES 
JosepM^T Minnocjc 
Attorneys for Defendants Winward Electric 
Service, Inc., and M^hael Wood 
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